The colonial opium monopoly systems remained a major point of international contention in the decades prior to World War II, driving a major wedge between British and US drug diplomats in particular. The issue typified the deeper divide between AngloAmerican drug diplomacy in Asia. The British approach stemmed from imperial realities and a self-perception of pragmatism aiming for gradual suppression of opium consumption via regulation. In contrast, the US approach remained grounded in a disdain for British (and broader European) imperialism in Asia and a moralistic, self-interested zeal driving towards absolute and immediate prohibition in the region. After decades of dispute, in 1942/3 the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics initiated a campaign to force a change in British and Dutch colonial opium policies in Asia. The British were reluctant to pursue prohibitionist policies, which they feared would be politically destabilising, fiscally detrimental and difficult to implement. However, they eventually acquiesced. This paper systematically examines the US policy advocacy campaign, the British response and Britain's reasons for agreeing to a major shift in colonial opium policy in the region. In so doing it aims to develop a new and deeper understanding of determinants of this policy change.
The British and, to a lesser extent, Dutch decision to end their opium monopolies and enact prohibitions on supply in colonies under Japanese occupation during WWII has rightly been viewed as a major turning point in international drug policy. 2 However, the causes of the shift in British policy have received relatively little attention and are not fully developed within current historiography on this topic. This is surprising given that the opium monopolies served as a clear flashpoint in the Anglo-American alliance during the war and highlighted deeper fissures in the Grand Alliance, which broader Asian and Anglo-American historiography has completely missed. The extensive Anglo-American historiography has a significant blind spot surrounding narcotics control in general. None of the tomes associated with mainstream historiography give any significant coverage to the role of the narcotics trade -although some give minor coverage to the tobacco trade.
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This paper evaluates the collapse of the Asian opium monopoly system during World War II and the Anglo-American role in that shift. Key tomes in the history of twentieth century
Anglo-American relations in Asia make no reference to this key issue, particularly those most closely associated to the wartime period of study. 4 In his broader history of twentieth century drug diplomacy, William McAllister briefly examines the issue; however this article challenges his core conclusions about British motives for policy change based on a more indepth review of relevant British archival materials. 5 William O'Walker's seminal study on 'Opium and Foreign Policy' also references the shift in British and Dutch opium policies, however, as this paper will highlight, O'Walker constructs an inaccurate account of the episode and the motivations of key actors. Others, such as Ethan Nadelmann, offer a broad overview of drug control in the twentieth century although deal with this issue in passing.
6 James Windle provides much insight into the political economy of the drug trade in South and Southeast Asia, which this article seeks to supplement. 7 Although, a number of accounts exist, which address the end of monopoly systems in Asia, this paper employs a comprehensive examination of archival materials to provide a new interpretive take on this policy shift. 8 At the outbreak of war in 1939, international drug control efforts, centred around the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee (OAC), stood as a mixture of contradictions and uncertainty. A typology based on three broad international positions can be derived from various national positions. On one side were the strict control advocates, led by the US. 9
Having exploited League insecurities to push their hard-line conception of control, they struggled to encourage compliance with, and widespread acceptance of, their approach. On another side were the producer states, agrarian countries whose economic, cultural and political systems were entwined with, and often partially dependent upon, the very drugs the system sought to limit. Success for control advocates was often a function of how much leverage could be brought to bear on producer states. 10
In the middle were the old colonial powers, of which Britain was the most prominent example for a number of reasons. First, Britain was the leading imperial power. Second, Britain had a long and chequered history of engagement with the drug trade, exemplified by the Opium Wars and its complex relationship with the international drug conventions. For example, James Mills argues that Britain was one of the earliest advocates for a global regulatory system while simultaneously seeking to protect its colonial interests, which often had a complex relationship with opium. Further, Britain was a key manufacturing State, requiring global market access and a cheap supply of raw opium. 11 Britain also recognised the role that addiction and the opium economy and monopolies played within many of its Asian colonies. London sought to balance its desire for international cooperation, which required US interests in this issue to be encouraged, with the realities of imperial governance and commercial interests, which militated against radical changes in policy. Asia, 1912 -1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991 Within the League, meanwhile, the sense of collective responsibility to vindicate international cooperation, particularly regarding arms control, led delegates to try to surmount the seemingly large obstacles to another drug control agreement. 39 The result was a compromise treaty, which regulated international drug manufacturing, and, for the first time, marked a clear distinction between legal and illicit traffic. It also saw the creation of another international oversight body, the Drug Supervisory Body (DSB).
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The optimism proved short lived. Delevingne retired from the Home Office (albeit remaining active within the system's apparatus until 1948), 41 London refused to enact radical policy changes in its colonies and the US quickly wearied of compromise. As the decade drew to a close the League Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) became consumed with designing a production limitation treaty but war intervened. In the meantime Britain had ignored US efforts to impose a specific timeline for eliminating both its opium monopolies and the practice of opium smoking in its colonies. 45 Anslinger would look to the confusion of wartime to effect a change in policy, particularly following a wave of international condemnation of Japan's opium policy towards China in the late 1930s, where opium appeared to be used as a weapon of war against Chinese populations. 
The Early War -September 1939 -1943:
When war broke out, the League drug apparatus hoped to remain aloof of the fighting. The PCOB requested all governments to continue sending statistics and the vast majority complied. 46 Britain remained strongly supportive of maintaining the entire League system. 47 The US maintained official relations with the PCOB and DSB (both independent treaty bodies) but not the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee (OAC With the fall of the Netherlands and France, evacuation of the PCOB and DSB from Europe to the US soon appeared to offer the best hope for the system's survival.
Britain was 'strongly in favour of the transfer of as many officials as possible concerned with narcotics to the US'. With the technical apparatus saved, but the OAC and the League drug secretariat placed in limbo, the system's political momentum ground to a halt. Anslinger and his allies continued vital behind the scenes efforts to circumvent and make redundant the OAC and its secretariat, which they viewed as ineffective and overly consensus-oriented institutions. Political struggles also quickly shifted to bilateral interactions, largely independent of the multilateral framework. The US would take the lead whilst the old colonial powers fought a stumbling rear-guard action. The colonial issue represented the key battleground in this wartime policy theatre. prohibition. The US and China demanded the immediate abolition of opium smoking as a mechanism to reduce global supplies and enable an enforceable production limitation agreement to be reached. The British and Dutch maintained that a production limitation agreement was first needed to reduce the leakages into the illicit market from China and Persia, following which the abolition of opium smoking and eating might be possible, 'provided that a reasonable transitional period is allowed'. 57
For the US, China and, to a lesser degree, Canada the causality was reversed: the monopoly system sustained the illicit market, addiction and non medical-scientific usage while stalling production limitation. By solving this question, forward momentum on a production limitation convention could be enabled. 58
China:
During the interwar period China disintegrated into warlordism, civil war and later war with Japan. Some of the political and economic difficulties likely arose as a direct result of a Anslinger also viewed 'Sir Malcolm's ideas' as 'typical of British Imperial policy' and suggested to Sharman that the US and Canadian governments 'march along together on a concrete plan involving the abolition of smoking opium after the war and limitation of production'. He went on, 'if we do not get agreement with the British Government before the war is over, we might as well give up the idea of progress as they will fall back to the pre-war tempo.' Sharman agreed but argued that mid-1942 was 'the worst possible time to take the initiative' as 'the dice would be loaded more heavily' against them. He suggested bringing the Soviet Union on board while they charted a path forward. 
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Sharman agreed 'whole-heartedly'. However, Anslinger's strategy involved a great deal of bluff. The US would have the right to establish any form of government in areas in which they had unilateral control. In areas of joint control, the US could not act unilaterally.
Morlock was dissuaded from further pursuit of the issue under pressure from the State Department, but privately suggested that Anslinger pursue it with the War and Navy
Departments by claiming that closing opium dens was a US legal obligation. 68
The League Old Guard:
In the meantime, Renborg had drafted two memos outlining post-war planning options. These Renborg's vision focused on consolidating the treaties, continuity of function of the 'system of estimates' trade monitoring system under the PCOB and DSB and the wholesale transfer of the League apparatus. Regarding the monopolies and quasi-medical consumption, he dismissed radical action, arguing 'prohibition could not be expected by itself to bring about the desired result' and suggesting further study. Moreover, they warned that the US press was snooping around the issue and viewed it as linked with other international problems.
Anslinger pointed to China's supposedly enormous successes and claimed that in the event of an occupation of Burma, China would enact strict prohibition on the sale of smoking opium.
Sharman and Chamberlain closed ranks and also praised China's domestic control efforts.
Sharman, however, was careful to make explicit that the views expressed were his own and that a formal Canadian policy had not yet been discussed. Anslinger then argued that China's policy could lead to a clash with the British. Vouching it as his own opinion, he said that Anslinger's portrayal of China was labelled the work of 'foreign and Chinese propagandists' back in London. They maintained that the main obstacle to total prohibition in the colonies adjacent to China remained 'smuggling by and on behalf of the Chinese communities resident therein.' London saw itself as at least being honest in refusing to enact a policy it could not enforce. One Foreign Office official, unaware that the American drug apparatus was staffed with many unreconstructed alcohol prohibitionists and highlighting the Foreign Office's lack of institutional knowledge on the drug issue, argued that, 'Americans with their experience of prohibition should be the first to appreciate the importance of avoiding a situation where the law itself is brought into contempt.' China, on the other hand, was seen as publicly enacting broad laws of suppression, while privately allowing profitable monopolies to function under the name of an 'Opium Suppression Bureau,' which marketed the drug as 'anti-opium medicine.' 87
The Dutch observer took a conciliatory attitude at the meeting but soon after requested the minutes be changed to express his defence of the Dutch monopoly system as the best means A core reason for the shift in British policy was a change in the costs and benefits around opium policies in the colonies. After the 1925 Conventions the colonial governments in Borneo and Malaya had imposed a system of registration and rationing for smokers.
Gradually rations were reduced, while efforts were made to improve social conditions. Hong Kong, however, was unable to enact clear opium suppression due to its proximity to mainland China. 94 During the 1920s, civil disorder in China caused an influx of black market opium. Rather than suppression, the goal of government policy became merely to coerce consumers into buying monopoly opium. Further, the fiscal benefits of the monopoly militated against efforts to change the system. 95 However, with these fiscal benefits and the concerns about administrative practicalities muted by the Japanese occupation, the desire to appease American demands in 1943 outweighed these former obstacles. This wartime logic applied across the various British territories occupied by Japan.
The Dutch unilaterally decided to acquiesce to US demands in August 1943, but postponed an announcement to allow Britain to make one in parallel. Acutely aware of the US public fears of opium and the US Government's desire to protect its troops, London no longer felt in a position to say 'no' to the US on this question. Moreover, Britain feared a public relations disaster should the American public blame the opium monopolies for infecting their soldiers with addiction. 100 Further, they expected a public relations windfall in the US following the announcement, which could help alleviate broader colonial policy tensions. Simultaneously, the administrative costs of prohibition were viewed as significantly less than they had been in the decades prior, particularly as the Japanese occupation had removed the administrative benefits. Finally, sacrificing the monopolies in British territories occupied by Japan would help appease American demands before they were extended to cover the more problematic case of India. 101 The policy shift would not apply to India, where the traditional method of opium consumption was by eating, not smoking. Mainland India was also not 'in enemy occupation.' 102 Burma proved the most complicated case and would drag on into the post-war era. Consequently, reiterating previous reservations, the 1943 statement explicitly warned that success would 'depend on the steps taken to limit and control the production of opium in other countries,' especially China. 103
Crossed Cables:
Anslinger was uncertain of the outcomes of the FPA meetings and initiated a public relations offensive in the US, stoking fears of a resurgent heroin trade after the war if the monopoly system was re-established and allowed to infect US troops. Britain became acutely aware during this time that any perceived increase in US troop consumption of opium in Burma and other territories would be blamed on them and were anxious to avoid being implicated. Asia, 1912 Asia, -1954 possessions. The situation on the ground would more than likely have called for a recreation of the monopoly system and the pre-war status quo, in the short term at least.
Announcements and Outcomes:
London began choreographing its statement to obtain 'the fullest possible publicity value, Nevertheless, the paradigm for the post-war multilateral drug control world was being shaped. Successful prohibition in one country depended on successful prohibition in all countries and Britain now had a more coherent vested interest in securing universal and effective supply controls throughout Asia. It seemed that much of the deadlock of the interwar years was headed for extinction. Having won this wartime coup, Anslinger had earned significant leverage both at home and abroad. He quickly turned his sights towards the Middle East and Iran in particular.
Conclusion:
The years 1939-43 had caused a significant earthquake in the international drug control system. With London's blessing, the League drug apparatus had fled to Washington and had subsequently witnessed an increased American influence. Simultaneously, a set of relationships had developed in London that would serve as an information exchange and counter-weight to this new US influence. Nevertheless, the leverage that the war afforded America, coupled with a rapidly evolving strategic arithmetic for London, allowed the US to influence British drug policy to an extent that would have been unthinkable in the pre-war years. With Anslinger having successfully bluffed a high level of resolve within the US government, Britain came to view its options in rather stark terms. The first option was to continue a fight to sustain monopolies in colonies it did not currently hold, and whose benefits it did not currently feel. Moreover, this would involve fighting for a system that many individuals within the British government viewed as unsustainable in the face of their pre-existing international commitments. ally and friend, upon whose future cooperation they were growing ever more dependent as the war dragged on.
The second option was to agree to US demands as far as possible, ignore administrative problems until after the colonies were firmly back in their hands, and reap what public relations victories the change in policy would afford, both within the US and China. Faced with this arithmetic, it is unsurprising that the British chose the latter option. Nevertheless, had Anslinger not used his wartime leverage and pushed the issue it is unlikely that such a resolution would have occurred. Consequently, by the close of 1943, the Commissioner could justifiably feel that he had gambled and won. He could now begin prodding producer States into joining the international opium trade system, strengthening domestic production controls, instituting and enforcing prohibitions and pushing towards a global production limitation agreement. Furthermore, the shift in policy would have major ramifications for drug control in Asia, fundamentally changing the trajectory of drug control. Much of the continued evolution in Asian drug policies over the remainder of the century and beyond could be
